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Evidence-Police Records Not Admissible to Prove Prior Criminal
Conviction Under the Federal Shop Book Rule-Defendant was indicted under the White Slave Act of the District of Columbia and during the course of the trial, the principal complaining witness testified
that she was afraid of the defendant. To rebut this testimony the defendant introduced a witness of his own. After cross examination of
this witness for the defense, the District Attorney attempted to impeach
his testimony by proof of a prior conviction of crime. The District
Attorney called a member of the police force who testified that a picture, which defendant on cross examination had identified as of himself, was from the files of the Identification Bureau at Police Headquarters. On the back of the picture was a series of notations of
convictions of various crimes. The witness for the prosecution was
then asked whether the record had been kept as a permanent part of
the files of the Police Department in connection with subsequent convictions related in the record here. The answer was, "Subsequent
conviction and then it became a part of the police records." This record
was then offered in evidence over objection, and admitted by the District court. Held: The disputed exhibit did not meet the requirements
of the District Code which concern proof of prior convictions, and
furthermore did not meet the requirements of the Federal Shop Book
Rule' as the proper foundation was not laid to make the Shop Book
Rule applicable. In addition the court stated that even were all the
requirements of the Shop Book Rule satisfied, such a record as this
could not be admitted to prove a prior conviction because outside the
scope of records admissible under the Shop Book Rule. Clainos v.
United States, 163 F. (2d) 593 (C.C.A., D.C., 1947).
It is to be noted that the decision was based primarily on the
ground that the proper foundation was not laid to have the record in
question admitted under the Shop Book Rule; it is dictum that appears
to rule out such evidence absolutely under the rule. The court reasons
that the Shop Book Rule is confined to records kept in the course of
the business of which the transaction in issue was a part, and that it
does not extend to an extrinsic record which might happen to have been
kept by a person not connected with that business. Thus if it were a
part of the occupation of a person or concern, such as a newspaper
representative or an insurance company, to keep regular records of
events occurring in a community, such records would not be admissible
as evidence under this rule. The court feels that while the Police are
directly concerned with convictions for crime, and it is necessary in
their "business" to keep records of such convictions for their own in-

128 U.S.C.A. 695 (June 20, 1936, c. 640, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 1561.).
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formation and use, still the recordation of such convictions is not itself
a part of their business.
Of course the decision is based solely upon an interpretation of a
statute, and the statute itself does not rule out this kind of proof in so
many words. It was stated in Palmer v. Hoffman:2
"... The several hundred years of history behind the Act
(Wigmore, supra, sections 1517-1520) indicate the nature of
the reforms it was designed to effect. It should of course be
liberally interpreted so as to do away with the anachronistic
rules which gave rise to its need and at which it was aimed.
But "regularcourse" of business must find its meaning in the
inherent nature of the business in question and in the methods
systematically employed for the conduct of the business as a
business. .. 3
Lines of interpretation of other Shop Book Statutes may be observed
upon examination of a few representative cases. In Hand v. Grant4
it was held that a mere memo book, kept by a sheriff, of property sold
under execution was not admissible in an action by the sheriff to recover the price of the land sold. In Rissling v. Milwaukee Electric
Railway and Light Company,5 the plaintiff sued for damages to his
person and automobile sustained in a collision with the defendant's
street car. The defendant claimed the plaintiff at the time of the collision was not sober. To substantiate this claim the defendant called a
police officer to the stand and succeeded in introducing a police record
of the third precinct in evidence. This record showed that the plaintiff
was arrested a few hours after the collision for disorderly conduct and
fined. The officer testifying did not make the arrest nor was he able
to use the record to refresh his recollection. The court, in line with
the instant case, reversed the decision on the ground that is was an
error for the trial court to admit such evidence to prove a conviction
and fine. While such cases are an example of records that cannot be
introduced into evidence under the Shop Book Rule, still there are
records, not too different in character, that are declared admissible. In
McDows v. Pig'n Whistle Corporation,6 an action for injuries to the
plaintiff, hospital records of his care and treatment for such injuries,
which were original records kept by nurses and doctors who attended
the patient in the usual course of business of the hospital and which
were sufficiently identified, were declared admissible. This is in line
with the present trend among the states to accept such records.7 In
2 318 U.S. 109 at 115, 63 S. Ct. 477 (1942).
a Italics the author's.
45 Smeded and M (Miss.) 508, 43 Am. Dec. 528.
5 203 Wis. 554, 234 N.W. 879 (1931).
6151 P. (2d) 850, Dist. Ct. of App., 2d Dist., Div. 3, Calif. (1944).
75 Wigmore 390 (3d. edition) sec. 1530.
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Franklin v. Skelly Oil Company,8 a civil action for personal injuries,
it was held that a written statement in the nature of a report by a public
officer acting pursuant to his statutory duty and contained in the files
of the office of the fire marshall of Oklahoma9 is ordinarily admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule as primary evidence of the fact
it purports to convey? °
The cases outlined above present decisions that run the course
from a strict to a liberal interpretation of the Shop Book Rule, but it
will be noted that every case where the evidence was admitted under
the Shop Book Rule involved other than a criminal action. To admit
such evidence under the Shop Book Rule in a criminal action in order
to prove a prior conviction would be extending the rule further than
any court in the past, and probably further than the statutory draftsmen have intended. The latter conclusion may be inferred from the fact
that the majority of states and the federal government have statutes
prescribing carefully the methods of proving prior convictions. The
Court in the instant case felt, and correctly in the opinion of the writer,
that to admit the offered evidence would be to circumvent such statutes.
CHARLES E.

RICHARDSON JR.

8 141 F. (2d) 568, (C.C.A. 10, 1944).
9 See also United States v. Cross, 20 D.C. 380, 1886 and 5 Wigmore 531 (3d.
edition) sec. 1635.
10 A personal injury case which seems to hold opposite to Rissling v. Milwaukee
Electric Railway and Light Company is Jacobson v. Bryan, 244 Wis. 359, 12
NW (2d) 789 (1944). There a card was introduced in evidence which contained statements made by a police officer who had investigated the automobile
collision involved, and had made physical measurements. These statements
were admitted on the basis that it was the "duty" of the officer to make such
a report, and under Wisconsin Statutes, Sec. 327.18, any official report made
by a public officer pursuant to law is admissible in evidence.

